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Abstract: 
In this essay, I defend the pragmatic relevance of race in history. 
Kant and Hegel’s racist development thesis assumes that nonwhite, 
non-European racial groups are defective practical agents. In 
response, philosophers have opted to drop race from a theory of 
history and progress. They posit that denying its pragmatic 
relevance amounts to anti-racist egalitarianism. I dub this tactic 
‘colorblind cosmopolitanism’ and offer grounds for its rejection. 
Following Du Bois, I ascribe, instead, a pragmatic role to race in 
history. Namely, Du Bois argues that race is an ‘instrument of 
progress’ that advances emancipatory struggle. He appeals to the 
writing of history—or historiography—to cultivate group 
consciousness of historical memory in order to (1) strengthen 
intragroup bonds among the racially oppressed, especially black 
Americans and (2) to create intergroup bonds that reconstruct the 
republic on the basis of universal ideals. I detail Du Bois’s defense 
of the black struggle for freedom in the wake of the U.S. Civil War 
to provide a concrete illustration of ‘spirit’ in American history.  
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Kant and Hegel’s views on race have become subject to critical scrutiny—no longer 
ignored as irrelevant elements of their philosophical systems. In formulating their philosophies of 
race and history, Kant and Hegel endorse the development thesis, the view that the implicit purpose 
of history is to actualize an “Infinite final End” or “Idea.” On their formulation, the development 
thesis holds that non-European, nonwhite racial groups are stalled in their development as human 
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subgroups. Kant and Hegel maintain that nonwhite racial groups lack modern institutions and posit 
Europe as the paragon of modernity. Because European political history encapsulates the species’ 
potential to be free, they hierarchically rank whites as exemplary and Black Africans and Native 
Americans as defective in the historical exercise of practical agency.i The development thesis thus 
tracks the apparent inferiority of nonwhite races as ineffective practical agents in the historical 
development of the species. 
Kant and Hegel assume that people of color unsuccessfully exercise their capacity for self-
determination. Their activities fail to amount to historical deeds that are worth remembering 
because they do not actualize the imperatives of freedom, which constitute the final end of history. 
Kant equates the imperatives of freedom with universal republican and cosmopolitan ideals, 
whereas Hegel identifies the imperatives of freedom with the achievement of ‘Spirit,’ in which a 
people promote a constitutional republic.ii Kant’s biological theory of race is a cross between a 
natural history of the earth’s geography, climate, and human physiology. Similarly, Hegel argues 
that nonwhite racial groups lack a political culture that evinces a self-conscious practical 
orientation towards freedom. The same Enlightenment philosophers who defend freedom and 
equality on principle also pioneer modern scientific racism rooted in racial biology. And so, the 
question of how to make sense of their racist pronouncement remains live.  
 In this essay, I propose a new interpretation of Kant and Hegel’s racist development thesis, 
one that draws on W.E.B. Du Bois’s original philosophy of race and history. Du Bois defends the 
pragmatic relevance of race in history, emphasizing the normative value of racial identity for 
emancipatory struggle. He turns to the writing of history—or historiography—as a way for racial 
groups to assert a distinct ethos for group consciousness of freedom. The practice of rewriting 
history, and strengthening collective historical memory, shapes the practical identity—or the 
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spirit—of a racial group. The pragmatic relevance of the concept of race, then, like Hegel’s concept 
of spirit, is a basis for group self-determination through historical time. Du Bois illuminates the 
systematic but overlooked black contribution to the historical development of the neophyte U.S. 
constitutional republic. He undertakes a revisionist history to recast black practical agency as the 
motor of progress in the wake of the U.S. Civil War. In this way, he treats race as an “instrument 
of progress,” which positions people of color within, rather than outside, of history; and he 
countenances that racial exclusion is the central obstacle to the advance of universal ideals in 
republics founded on a white supremacist monopoly on power and resources (1986, 817).  
My argument proceeds as follows. First, I detail how race and racism figure in Kant and 
Hegel’s development thesis, before presenting Du Bois’s account of the pragmatic relevance of 
race in U.S. history. In Section I, I assess Pauline Kleingeld’s influential claim that the mature 
Kant of the mid-1790s abandons his racist views. Kleingeld’s defense of Kant favors what I call a 
colorblind cosmopolitanism, in which race holds no pragmatic relevance whatsoever. On her view, 
the mature Kant favors a purely physiological theory of race that is inconsequential in historical 
development (2014, 58, 64-5). In Section II, I scrutinize whether Hegel’s concept of spirit can 
capture the significance of race in history. Finally, in Section III, I defend Du Bois’s account of 
the pragmatic relevance of black racial consciousness. Du Bois’s theory of progress defends a 
historiography that positions African Americans as central to the development of the U.S. 
constitutional republic in the wake of the U.S. Civil War. 
I. Kant’s Philosophy of Race and History: Why Colorblind Cosmopolitanism is 
Not Good Enough 
 
Kant’s philosophy of race assesses the inherent ineptitude, as well as the suitability, of the 
human species to promote the requirements of morality and justice. To wit, his pragmatic 
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anthropology ascertains the effectiveness of the species to form constitutional republics, a hallmark 
of modernity. In his essays on race (1785-88) and in his lectures on anthropology and physical 
geography (1781-2), he considers race through the lens of natural science. Defending a 
monogenetic theory of race, he claims that all racial groups are members of the human species, 
descending from an “original phylum” (2013, 84-5, 199-200). In response to environmental 
pressures, the human species fractured into “seeds” (Keime) that formed “natural predispositions” 
(Naturanlangen) and racialized human biology (Kant 2013, 85). The biological formation of racial 
groups is irreversible and entails such heritable “racial” features, such as skin color and hair 
texture, to which Kant assigns a dysfunctional pragmatic relevance, namely, the deformation of 
character and intellect. His “natural history” of the “Negro,” “Red,” and “Yellow” races confirms 
a defective “pragmatic disposition” for modern statecraft (Kant 2013, 418-19).iii Racial biology 
thus ranks races according to a “natural” disposition for modern politics.iv 
Kant scholars have tried to save Kant from himself by arguing that his philosophy of race 
contradicts his moral and political universalism. Prima facie, his defense of rational practical 
agency and public right, which are grounded in persons’ innate right to freedom, appear 
incompatible with his racist view. For example, in two well-known essays, Kleingeld objects that 
by the mid-1790s Kant has second thoughts that lead him to abandon his early racist view and 
discern the inconsistency between his universalism and his racial inegalitarianism (2007, 586-92; 
2014, 52-58). She claims that Kant is an inconsistent universalist, rather than a consistent 
inegalitarian, who eventually assigns equal juridical standing to all humans and supports peoples’ 
self-determination against colonial encroachment in a cosmopolitan condition (2007, 58). For the 
mature Kant, Europeans should not exploit peoples in foreign lands and should respect their 
cultural life forms. All peoples are entitled to territorial sovereignty over their lands and to political 
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self-determination. 
There are at least two problems with Kleingeld’s interpretation of Kant as an inconsistent 
universalist. First, it is not clear in what sense Kant’s universalism “contradicts” his racist 
development thesis about how legislative reason becomes practically effective in historical time. 
For him, unequal development is a natural fact about the human species. His observations about 
race are supposed to “scientifically” or “empirically” confirm whether legislative reason is a 
practical success among humans. Race is a marker for a shared practical commitment to freedom, 
manifest in dominant social practices, namely, a modern political culture. One can “consistently” 
affirm universal ideals, while rejecting that nonwhite peoples have lived up to them as a matter of 
empirical fact.v Therefore, the contention that persons of color have an innate right to freedom, 
and share an equal juridical standing in domestic and international law, does not by itself improve 
their inferior rank in a “scientifically established” racial hierarchy. In other words, for Kant, we 
can be juridical equals in an abstract sense—such that Europeans ought not take advantage of 
‘pastoral peoples’—and yet still assume that ‘pastoral peoples’ have failed to exercise an innate 
capacity for legislative reason in an “empirical” sense. Although humans comprise a reproductive 
species with an innate capacity for legislative reason, some racial groups are better prepared than 
others to exercise the latter capacity, and have made more significant contributions to realize 
universal ideals (Kant 2012, 274).vi  
One might object, with Kleingeld, that condemning the failure of peoples around the globe 
to enact the requirements of morality and justice is not in itself racist, inasmuch as it simply avows 
that ideals diverge from reality. But it is misguided to assume that one can condemn racial groups 
on the ‘innocent’ basis that morality and justice is hard for everyone. Consider the popular racist 
ideology of cultural racism. It denigrates nonwhite racial groups for possessing an ‘inferior’ 
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culture, and fosters a disdain against socializing, and sharing neighborhoods and resources, with 
black and brown persons. This racist ideology does not deny that all races are humans with basic 
moral entitlements. Rather, cultural racism accuses certain racial groups of ‘backwardness’ for an 
apparent collective neglect of morality and justice, or for an apparent failure to exemplify cultural 
excellence on account of a defective culture unworthy of esteem. Likewise, a monogenetic theory 
of race that concedes that all races are humans who ought to share a cosmopolitan condition does 
not necessarily override a racially denigrating outlook. 
A second, related problem with Kleingeld’s interpretation is it endorses what I call 
colorblind cosmopolitanism. A colorblind cosmopolitanism, like colorblind racism, asserts that 
white and nonwhites are free and equal persons, but obscures that race and racism shapes the 
objective structure of the world and group consciousness. Tommie Shelby explains: 
Advocates of colorblindness […] argue that persons should be treated not as 
representatives of their race but instead as individuals. There are no group rights—only 
rights of individuals to equal treatment. However, the use of classifications and 
generalizations in law and public policy is ubiquitous, absolutely necessary, and entirely 
legitimate. Imagine trying to make policy or laws without relying on broad categories such 
as ‘persons over the age of y’ or ‘persons who scored at least z on the exam.’ These 
classifications treat persons ‘as individuals’ no more than racial classifications do; and they 
do not presuppose that groups rather than individuals have rights. (2016, 31) 
 
Racial categories have pragmatic significance because they highlight racial inequalities that would 
otherwise be missed without racial classifications that group individuals under the sociohistorical 
phenomena that have racialized them. Racial categories influence group self-awareness and create 
important normative resources for emancipatory struggle, namely, they afford the oppressed a 
shared foundation for cultural expression and for making political claims. For racial self-
identification can function to motivate the struggle against racial exclusion and thereby advance 
the standing of all persons as free and equal. In contrast, a colorblind cosmopolitanism appears to 
drop race as a meaningful basis for understanding the modern world and for shaping group 
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consciousness. A colorblind cosmopolitanism fails to confront that in a modern world scarred by 
white supremacy, for better or for worse, racial consciousness builds robust intragroup bonds; race 
has profound pragmatic significance for the pursuit of cosmopolitan and republican ideals.vii Of 
course, one can choose to act as an ‘individual’ for whom racial ascriptions ‘transcend’ one’s 
personal version reality—as in “I am ‘human’, not ‘white’!”—but such a colorblind stance is 
unhelpful for emancipatory struggle in the face of racial inequality. Indeed, it is hard to see how 
racial groups can dismantle racial inequality without group consciousness of their racialized social 
locations. 
Kleingeld’s colorblind cosmopolitanism discounts the pragmatic relevance of race in the 
pursuit of cosmopolitan and republican ideals, and suggests instead that race is irrelevant for the 
practical advance of freedom vis-à-vis universal ideals (2014, 58, 64-5). Ergo, on her view, the 
mature Kant espouses a “purely physiological” view of race, in which race is inconsequential in 
modern history and politics. At best, race is a natural fact about biological differentiation, shaped 
by climate and geography. And yet, on her reading, natural facts have no political history. They 
are arbitrary physiological features that lump together individuals who share neither a political 
history nor a social location nor group consciousness. She thus defends universal cosmopolitan 
citizenship at the cost of turning a ‘blind’ eye to the normative salience of race in the modern 
world. People of color are, then, juridical equals in a cosmopolitan condition who just happen to 
share a ‘racial’ physiology—whatever that might be. And so, we must ask, is this the best that an 
anti-racist critique can do? 
One might object that we must not superimpose a theory of race on an aggregate of 
disparate individuals. A colorblind cosmopolitanism that denies the pragmatic relevance of race is 
preferable to the far worse alternative of imputing an extraneous racial content to persons’ exercise 
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of free choice. Such a theoretical move suggests a familiar repulsive trope in which racial biology 
determines persons’ temperament and intelligence. However, recognizing that racial difference 
can shape group consciousness and, in turn, impact political claims, does not undermine 
individuals’ free choice or equal treatment. Rather Du Bois envisions that cultivating racial 
consciousness is useful for promoting social reforms that expand persons’ access to basic rights 
and opportunities in the context of profound racial inequality. A group’s self-awareness of their 
racial identity conditions the meaningful exercise of their practical agency; in its absence, a 
colorblind individual will be unable to recognize concrete obstacles to their freedom, especially if 
their race ascribes to them a subordinate social location.  
Furthermore, in Kant’s lifetime, as in the contemporary moment, colorblind 
cosmopolitanism neglects to challenge the implicit assumption that Whites are bona fide 
exemplars of modernity. The equal juridical standing of peoples does not entail that all racial 
groups enjoy reciprocal recognition of their practical identity as contributing to modern history 
and politics. The enlightened Kant bars whites from enslaving, colonizing, and taking advantage 
of distant peoples. However, a colorblind cosmopolitanism can mask racial chauvinism. 
Kleingeld’s reconstructed Kant can maintain that nonwhite racial groups do not advance history 
on account of their accomplishment of historical deeds. That is, they remain absent from history. 
We must, instead, defend the goal of reciprocal recognition among racial groups, acknowledging 
that each group is an effective practical agent worthy of esteem and whose achievements advance 
history on the basis of universal ideals.  
 
II. Hegel, Race, and the Writing of History  
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Like Kant, Hegel endorses a racist development thesis. In his lectures on history, Hegel 
asserts that African and Afro-descended peoples are steeped in a “natural spirit” (Natürgeister). 
He rejects that nonwhite racial groups contribute in any significant fashion to the actualization of 
universal ideals, claiming that Africans “do not have a history in the true sense of the word” and 
lack a self-conscious practical orientation towards freedom (1976, 190). But, in contrast to the 
mature Kant, Hegel does not regard race as a “natural” or “physiological” fact. Instead he projects 
an embryonic “natural spirit” on all peoples, such that a shared practical identity mediates every 
path forward in the development of world history. If we accept this premise, then we can appreciate 
that, in principle, all peoples can make a positive pragmatic contribution to history, and a racial 
consciousness can impact the development of history. This is the heart of the Du Boisian insight 
into the philosophy of history and race: the idea of racial difference—or the spirit that structures 
racial consciousness—can provide a normative foundation on which racial groups make political 
claims, advance universal ideals, and create history. 
Hegel distinguishes the influence of nature on development from the idea of natural spirit. 
A group can hold either a “subjective” or an “external” relation to nature (Hegel 1976, 153). An 
external relation marks how geography and climate impacts social practices; for example, living 
on a coastline constrains whether or not a people become sea-faring. The idea of natural spirit, 
however, represents a nascent form of group consciousness, manifesting in dominant social 
practices. An external relation to nature is not a passive medium through which nature imprints its 
form; instead it is a necessary departure point for achieving a “particular and determinate” self-
consciousness (Hegel 1976, 153). Natural spirit indicates an underdeveloped awareness of freedom 
inasmuch as a people take the natural world, e.g., the moon and stars, as relevant criteria for self-
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determination. In the case of Africans, Hegel writes, spirit betrays a dependency on nature that 
resorts to “sorcery,” “superstition,” and “magic” to manipulate the natural environment. 
Hegel’s racist development thesis contends that nonwhite, non-Europeans languish in 
natural spirit, unable to master cultural life forms that instantiate the requirements of morality and 
justice, or define a determinate spiritedness that reflect group consciousness of freedom. Natural 
spirit, for Hegel, becomes synonymous with racialized cultural backwardness. “Africa,” he 
comments, “is the continent in which […] the principle of cultural backwardness predominates” 
(1976, 172). He continues, “differences in spiritual character remain tied to physical peculiarities” 
(1976, 173). African, indigenous, and Asian cultures are not realized “in practice,” but remain in 
potentia, thwarted by “natural peculiarity” (Hegel 1976, 172). In this respect, Hegel’s racist 
development thesis is more radical than Kant’s: he concurs that the development of the species is 
naturally unequal. He adds, however, that nonwhite racial groups manifest an “innocent” “animal-
like” group consciousness. Contra Kant, he does not just seek  
empirical confirmation that the capacities of some racial groups are unrealized. He infers the 
capacities of some racial group are permanently unrealizable as spirit, that is, as group 
consciousness of freedom. 
Yet, as we’ve seen, Hegel’s characterization of natural spirit cannot reduce race to arbitrary 
empirical facts. Nature cannot foreclose a group’s practical commitment to, or advance of, the 
imperatives of freedom.viii In other words, there are no extrinsic barriers to the historical 
development of group consciousness of freedom (Kirkland 2017, 44-6). The concept of spirit must 
endorse the idea of human perfectibility in modern history. Hegel explains that “deeds” illustrate 
the “Spirit” of a people striving to be free: 
It is the essence of Spirit to act, to make itself explicitly into what it already is implicitly—
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to be its own deed, and its own work. Thus it becomes the object of its own attention, so 
that its own existence is there for it to be conscious of. That is the case with the Spirit of a 
people: it is a definite Spirit, one that builds itself up into an entire world, which subsists 
and persists, here and now, in its religion, its forms of worship, its customs, its forms of 
government and political laws, in the entire scope of its institutions, its deeds and events. 
This is its work—it is what a people is. A people is what its deeds are. (1976, 77) 
The historical accomplishment of deeds showcases a group “build[ing] itself up into an entire 
world” through its attachments, customs, and social arrangements. For group consciousness 
captures a distinct practical identity forged through historical efforts. As members of a social 
whole, individuals are located within a normative horizon in which reason-giving and sharing 
shape group consciousness in an ongoing fashion. Because the goal of spirit is to become “self-
conscious,” spirit should not take any extrinsic standard to model its cultural integrity. For the Idea 
of freedom is not imposed from without on group consciousness. There is no final, one-size-fits-
all institutional expression of the ongoing actualization of the Idea of freedom. Rather, historical 
development must track the radical specificity of diverse peoples’ cultural life forms through the 
historical achievement of deeds.  
 Reading Hegel against himself, Frank Kirkland notes that the race concept—and a 
racialized group consciousness—manifest and foster the achievement of historical deeds by all 
peoples around the globe (2017, 44). Because the goal of spirit is to become “self-conscious,” a 
people need not adopt European customs as an extrinsic standard for self-determination. In other 
words, “although the principle of th[e] exercise [of collective self-determination] has its origins in 
Europe, it is not distinctly European, because its validity cannot be measured by its point of origin” 
(Kirkland 1993, 161). Rather, a people achieve self-consciousness as free by asserting what they 
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judge to be normatively salient attachments, customs, and social arrangements. This does not 
mean, however, that modernity devolves into relativistic claims about incommensurable cultural 
life forms. That would imply a developmental stasis, in which all peoples stand inert and history 
ends. Instead, though Hegel refuses to do so, we can reconstruct a racially egalitarian philosophy 
of history that posits a theory of progress, drawing on the positive pragmatic significance of racial 
consciousness in history. Racial groups achieve history—and refine self-consciousness—through 
the accomplishment of deeds. 
Rather than assume Kleingeld’s colorblind cosmopolitanism in which race plays no 
meaningful role in history, Du Bois defends a historiography that illuminates the historical 
achievement of deeds among diverse racial groups. Indeed, Du Bois stresses that we cannot “write 
universal history [that] leaves out Africa” and Afro-descendent peoples (1910, 5). All peoples then, 
including African and Afro-descendent peoples, assert their character and cultural integrity, even 
if Hegel was dumb to this possibility. Specifically, we can appeal to the cultivation and writing of 
historical memory to illustrate how racial attachments can and should orient group consciousness 
and motivate collective judgment and action (Cf. Kirkland 2017, 44).  
Du Bois argues that the writing of history, or historiography, best captures group 
consciousness of freedom in its external aspect, that is, in dominant social practices that shape the 
practical identity of a people. For historiography is not just the empirical confirmation of one thing 
happening after another (Hegel 1976, 60). Written histories clarify a people’s values and offer 
public recognition of the historical efforts that actualized them. Du Bois was acutely aware that 
the politics of controlling history mirrors the racial politics of whose life matters in the public’s 
eye.ix Sound historiographical practice should facilitate reciprocal recognition among racial groups 
whose efforts contributed to the practical advance of freedom for all. 
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III. Du Bois on Race and Modern American History 
 
Du Bois argues that all peoples, including African and Afro-descended peoples, are self-
determining practical agents and are defective in neither physiology nor culture, but are in the 
historical process of shaping themselves into a social whole under “universally binding directives” 
or “ideals” (Du Bois 1986; Hegel 1976, 65). He refashions the development thesis to defend the 
pragmatic relevance of race in world history. In particular, in his work as an American historian, 
he showcases the prodigious but derogated contributions of African Americans to American 
history, foregrounding the black-American struggle against slavery.x He appeals to historical 
memory to cultivate group consciousness in order to (1) strengthen intragroup bonds among black 
Americans and (2) to create intergroup bonds among the American people as a whole to reconstruct 
the republic using universal ideals. 
To be sure, in his early years, Du Bois viewed Europe as a paragon of modernity, one that 
he sought to emulate in the figure of German Emperor Otto von Bismarck.xi I submit, however, 
that his turn to rewriting U.S. history indicates a rejection of Eurocentric standards for evaluating 
modernity. Instead, he defends the formation of a distinct peoples (both black Americans and 
Americans as such) in the reconstruction of the U.S. republic. He looks to the African-American 
community as advocating ideals that destroyed a slavocracy and established a constitutional 
republic in its wake. His historiography of the U.S. thus highlights the achievement of black 
historical deeds as central to the idiosyncratic narrative of what it means to be Black and to be an 
American. 
 
i. Black Racial Consciousness as Shared Practical Identity or ‘Spirit’ 
 
In his much-discussed essay “The Conservation of Races,” which he delivered as a speech 
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at the American Negro Academy in 1896, Du Bois argues that physical differences alone cannot 
explain “spiritual differences” among racial groups, but those spiritual differences should be 
“conserved” to deliver a “particular message” to the world. A racial group, he explains, carries an 
ideal that shapes the practical identity or spirit of a people (1986, 817). A racial ideal is a “peculiar 
principle” that tracks a racial group’s “inner thought” and characterizes its “spiritual” life (1986, 
817). This peculiar principle outlines “a distinct sphere of action and an opportunity for race 
development” (Du Bois 1986, 817). For Du Bois, African and African-American culture, religion, 
and customs have a universal character and posit an as-yet unrealized ideal for the future—a 
“message” that has yet to be “delivered.” 
And what is the message? At a minimum, it is the message that African and Afro-
descendent peoples have strived and will continue to strive for freedom.xii Du Bois claims that 
group striving for freedom captures a “racial” illustration of an “ideal of life.”xiii Racial 
consciousness functions as a vehicle for sustaining in-group affiliation on the basis of a shareable 
reason for judgment and action grounded in an ideal. To the extent that the ideal of freedom 
mediates self-consciousness among racial groups, racial difference can and should function as a 
mechanism for historical development. Du Bois thus affirms that racial identity is not a static 
object, but a dynamic and unstable practical orientation “infinitely transcending” human 
physiology. 
Du Bois’s historiography preserves black historical memory and showcases that black 
racial consciousness tracks group consciousness of—and striving for—freedom. As we’ve seen, 
Hegel rejects that the group consciousness of African and Afro-descendant persons can ever 
represent a self-conscious striving for freedom, much less be preserved in cultural life forms. To 
be sure, Hegel argues that customs are the means through which groups shape their subjective 
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sense of practical agency through historical time. Culture educates individuals—mediates the 
subjective will via group consciousness—so that groups can advance universal ideals to 
reconstitute themselves and the world in perpetuity. A people’s culture or spirit is “the distinct 
particularity [that] actually constitutes the characteristic principle of a people” (Hegel 1976, 67). 
Du Bois challenges Hegel’s formulation of spirit to capture black striving for freedom in the light 
of racial exclusion and denigration. For example, despite harrowing circumstances, Du Bois details 
that slavery elicited cultural responses that represent a self-conscious striving for freedom, which 
was preserved in African-American cultural artefacts, such as song, literature, and dance. Contra 
Hegel, African-American culture is not a living fossil of a subhuman race or a natural spirit lagging 
behind Anglo-European worldliness. The ideal of freedom is vital in black historical development 
and establishes that African and Afro-descended peoples are within world history, not outside of 
it, entrapped in nature. In fact, black cultural life structured group subjectivity to foment uprisings. 
In Black Reconstruction, he identifies the general strike among slaves as the first instance of a 
republican ideal of freedom inching toward realization in the neophyte republic (1992, chp. 1). A 
vibrant political culture among the enslaved established a normative foundation for struggle that 
precipitated emancipation.  
Moreover, rewriting American history to showcase black deeds can protect black 
normative self-understanding in the context of ongoing racial exclusion and denigration. The 
writing and cultivation of black historical memory structured group consciousness in 
circumstances that aimed to annihilate black Americans’ subjective sense of entitlement to 
freedom. Du Bois hopes that a historiography of black deeds can continue to strengthen intragroup 
bonds, and bolster positive intragroup self-understanding, for the U.S. republic still stands as an 
obstacle, rather than a bulwark, to the exercise of black practical agency.  
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In a reworked development thesis, Du Bois maintained that black historical memory can 
bolster the resolve among black Americans to keep fighting for freedom in the face of perpetual 
losses. For it impresses on group consciousness how much work must still be done. He notes that 
the “soul” and “striving” of his people reveals unrealized hopes for a better future in the aftermath 
of slavery, the failure of Reconstruction, and the emergence of Jim Crow (Kirkland 1993, 156). 
To be sure, anyone can choose to join an emancipatory struggle, but a common historical memory 
is more likely to motivate one to do so. After all, members of a vulnerable racial group tend to 
stand in the same relation to the past, on the same side of the color line, and often have restricted 
access to rights and resources that continue to crush one’s aspiration. A shared historical memory 
can sharpen the psychological feeling of self-worth and personal power, notwithstanding one’s 
subordinate social location. In other words, historical memory is a unique source of strength: it 
can impart tenacity, even as it points to the accumulation of brutal losses. Unfortunately, an 
oppressed people’s own history can be suppressed and belittled. Du Bois uses historiography to 
shape black racial consciousness and strengthen intragroup solidarity among a beleaguered people. 
The recent controversies about Confederate monuments in the U.S. underscore the power 
of historical memory to mobilize racial groups. Some Whites’ sense of self-worth remains tied to 
honoring a slavocracy. This is why historical memory alone is insufficient to mediate subjective 
will formation in group consciousness, and must instead be articulated through a universal ideal 
that aspires to actualize the freedom of all. Historical memory can be abused to narrow the scope 
of civic concern. A racial group’s drive for power and belonging can subvert the universal ideals 
that underlie a constitutional republic. As I explain below, by acknowledging the black 
contribution to American history, the polity can learn to forge intragroup political bonds across 
the color line. 
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ii. Black Racial Consciousness as Impetus of Modern American History 
Du Bois argues that a racial ideal shapes group consciousness, which, in turn, spurs the 
universally binding directives that make progress possible. A racial ideal can restructure the 
republic, not just motivate the practical agency of a particular racial group. The modern concept 
of race thus functions as an “instrument of progress” (1986, 817-19).xiv Though Du Bois 
emphasizes that black historical memory should forge intragroup bonds in the black-American 
community in the face of ongoing racial denigration and exclusion, he also emphasizes that the 
historical accomplishment of black deeds should be recognized as the common political heritage 
of the republic. Publicly honoring black historical memory can help create intergroup bonds 
among the American people and establish a public commitment to reconstruct the republic. Du 
Bois is keen to assert that he is Black and that he is an American, with a stake in the fate of the 
republic, and that all groups should help carry the burden of instantiating progress in the polity. 
Racial identity—and its “ideals”—function as both a vehicle for in-group affiliation and as 
an instrument of progress. The pragmatic significance of black American identity in history is 
inward-oriented: it captures and strengthens intragroup bonds that shape black racial 
consciousness. But the pragmatic significance of race is also outward-oriented, inasmuch as it 
encourages people to confront racial inequality and form racially pluralistic intergroup bonds on 
the basis of universal ideals. Du Bois envisions that racial equality nurtures social harmony through 
racial differentiation; and he prioritizes the ongoing reciprocal recognition of historically 
actualized difference (Jeffers 2013, 414-22). He observes that while black Americans should resist 
absorption into “white America,” they also make a “peculiar contribution […] to the culture of 
their common country” (1986, 61).  
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Against popular histories that lamented the historical role of African Americans as 
disastrous, Du Bois affirms that American modernity is a sui generis black historical achievement 
and ought to be recognized as such. He emphasizes the pragmatic relevance of black racial 
consciousness in restructuring a constitutional republic in the aftermath of the U.S. Civil War. 
Slaves’ assertion of an inalienable entitlement to freedom in the general strike was the impetus for 
the creation of a centralized constitutional state during the Reconstruction era (Du Bois 1992, 50). 
Preserving the historical memory of this unprecedented deed upends the assumption that Blacks 
are somehow culturally defective as a people. Instead, Du Bois encourages Americans to have a 
broader appreciation of the myriad black historical contributions that helped create modern 
American political culture: 
We are the people whose subtle sense of song has given America its only American music, 
its only American fairytales, its only touch of pathos and humor amid its mad money-
getting plutocracy. As such, it is our duty to conserve our physical powers, our intellectual 
endowments, our spiritual ideals; as a race we must strive by race organization, by race 
solidarity, by race unity to the realization of that broader humanity which freely recognizes 
differences in men, but sternly deprecates inequality in their opportunities of development. 
(Du Bois 1986, 58) 
The black racial ideal thus interpenetrates the development of modern American political culture. 
Du Bois asserts that if other groups remember the black historical contribution, it can create 
political bonds in support of universal ideals to which all groups ought to commit. The rebuilding 
of a republic is political task in which, ideally, all ought to contribute and reciprocally recognize 
the value of each other’s contributions. For at the very core of what it means to be an American lie 
distinct, intersecting racial contributions that dislodge the assumption that whites are the only ‘real’ 
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Americans.  
To the extent that white America resents that a black racial ideal interpenetrates the 
republic, then it suggests a persistent unwillingness to share power and resources. For this reason, 
Du Bois’s historical revisionism stresses the public recognition of the black contribution to 
American history, as it better prepares white America to commit to universal ideals to restructure 
the republic and dismantle racial inequality. The desire to suppress the black historical contribution 
often buttresses a white supremacist monopoly on power and resources. Du Bois thus asserts his 
stake as a civic equal in the U.S. republic. He asks, “Your country? How come it yours? Before 
the Pilgrims landed we were here. [O]ur gift of the Spirit [has not] been merely passive. Actively 
we have woven ourselves with the warp and woof of this nation,--we fought their battles, shared 
their sorrow, mingled our blood with theirs, and generation after generation have pleaded [for] 
Justice, Mercy, and Truth[.] Are not these gifts worth giving? Would American have been America 
without her Negro people?” (2007, 97). In posing the rhetorical question to a silent reader, he 
commands his reader to remember what actually happened: the death white America wrought and 




This essay surveys what role—if any—the concept of race can play in a philosophy of 
history in Kant, Hegel, and Du Bois. I reject the position of colorblind cosmopolitanism that 
assumes that race must be immaterial in a racially egalitarian theory of development. Following 
Du Bois, I defend the positive pragmatic significance of race in history and use his revisionist 
approach to American history as a case study. Du Bois illustrates that black-American deeds 
spurred the formation of a constitutional republic and a modern political culture in the U.S. Black 
 20 
historical memory affords a positive normative self-understanding to a historically derogated racial 
group. Du Bois adds that public recognition of black deeds can also function as an instrument of 
progress against a white-supremacist polity. He reworks the development thesis to provide an 
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i There is a rich growing literature about Kant’s theory of race. See: (Lu-Adler, forthcoming; 
Basevich 2020; Mensch 2017a, 2017b; Valdez 2017; Bernasconi 2001; Louden 2000). For 
representative literature on Hegel and race, see (Stone 2017; Zambrana 2017; Kirkland 2017). 
ii Due to space constraints, I do not detail the differences between Kant and Hegel’s conceptions 
of the ideals that constitute the final end of history; it is not necessary for the purpose of my 
argument, which chart how race mediates the historical pursuit of universal ideals.  
iii These are the relevant four races Kant lists in his lectures (2013, 320-21; 2012, 197). 
iv Louden helpfully notes “A study of the character of the human races construed as a ‘products 
of the play of nature’ means that what is supposedly being studied is not moral character but 
physical characteristics. Moral character, again, concerns ‘what the human being makes of 
himself’ (Anth 7:292). Race would seem to be a paradigm instance of what ‘nature makes of the 
human being’ (7:292)” (2000, 94).  
v Cf. (Bernasconi 2011, esp. 308-11). 
vi Cf. Kant’s discussion of active and passive citizenship in the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant’s 
racist development thesis complements his rationalization of social inequality via passive 
citizenship for marginalized social groups, including wage-laborers and women. 
vii In Darkwater, Du Bois notes that white consciousness tends to support a monopoly on power 
and resources, whereas he defends an ‘emancipatory’ black racial consciousness to secure rights 
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and resources on the basis of the universal ideal of freedom for all. Whether for better or for 
worse, one must confront, rather than ignore, the pragmatic relevance of race in history. 
viii Cf. (Kirkland 2017, 44-46). So too Du Bois asserts that Africa must be “an integral part of the 
great movement of world history. Yet it is true that the history of Africa is unusual, and its 
strangeness is due in no small degree to the physical peculiarities of the continent” (2001, 5). 
Thanks to Robert Williams for bringing this passage in The Negro to my attention. 
ix Du Bois completes his magnum opus Black Reconstruction to refute the then-dominant 
“Dunning school” that argued that black Emancipation “ruined” American democracy. 
x Save for scattered remarks, Du Bois overlooks indigenous efforts at self-determination in the 
Americas during the colonial and postbellum period, during which the U.S. inflicted genocidal 
violence and established colonial rule. 
xi His early fondness for Bismarck is perhaps most evident in his commencement address at Fisk 
in June 1888. 
xii Cf. (Harris 2019, 678). 
xiii His approach to historiography centers racial consciousness and differentiation as the motor 
for the advance of universal ideals: “If this be true, then the history of the world is the history, 
not of individuals, but of groups, not of nations, but of races, and he who ignores or seeks to 
override the race idea in human history ignores and overrides the central thought of all history” 
(Du Bois 1986, 816-17). 
xiv Cf. (Jeffers 2017, 222–55). 
